The 9/11 Commission and the White House: Issues of Executive Privilege and Separation of Powers by Marcus, Daniel
American University National Security Law Brief
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 2
2011
The 9/11 Commission and the White House:
Issues of Executive Privilege and Separation of
Powers
Daniel Marcus
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University National Security Law Brief by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marcus, Daniel "The 9/11 Commission and the White House: Issues of Executive Privilege and Separation of Powers," American
University National Security Law Brief, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol1/iss1/2
19NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND THE WHITE HOUSE: 
ISSUES OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
DANIEL MARCUS*
INTRODUCTION
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, popularly known as the 
9/11 Commission,1 came into being at the end of  2002 after a long and tortuous legislative process.  
The families of  the victims of  the 9/11 attacks, who felt that their Government failed to protect 
their family members on 9/11, trusted neither the Executive Branch nor Congress to conduct an 
investigation of  the attacks and their causes.2  They lobbied Congress persistently for the creation of  
an independaent Commission that would investigate the causes of  the 9/11 attacks and assign blame 
to those in the Government who had failed to prevent the attacks.3  The Bush Administration, cit-
ing the need for national unity and resolve in the aftermath of  the attacks and in the new “War on 
Terrorism,” resisted creation of  an independent Commission.4  Additionally, the Republican leader-
ship in Congress tried to head off  legislation by creating, in the spring of  2002, a joint inquiry by the 
House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the intelligence failures preceding the 9/11 attacks.5
This effort did not appease the organizations of  9/11 families, and their constant pressure for 
an independent investigation eventually paid off.  In July 2002 the House, with most Republican 
*      Fellow in Law and Government, American University, Washington College of  Law.
Professor Marcus served as Associate Attorney General (2000–2001), and General Counsel of  the 9/11 Commission 
(2003–2004).  From 1973–1977 and 1981–1988, he was a partner in the Washington law fi rm of  Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering.  During the Carter Administration he was Deputy General Counsel of  the Department of  Health, Education 
and Welfare, and General Counsel of  the Department of  Agriculture.
1  See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT xv 
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report]. 
2  See Audrey Hudson, House Approves Panel on September 11 Attacks, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at A14. 
3  See id. 
4  See id. (observing that the White House reiterated its support for the ongoing joint inquiry  by the House and Senate 
Intelligence panels while opposing the proposed independent panel).
5  See id. (noting that House Speaker Dennis Hastert, Majority Leader Dick Armey, Majority Whip Tom DeLay, and 
Rep. Porter Goss, chairman of  the Select Committee on Intelligence, believed that the newly created Commission would 
cause a further diversion of  essential personnel from the ongoing joint inquiry by the House and Senate intelligence 
panels).
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members in opposition, passed a bill creating the Commission, and Senators McCain and Lieberman 
pressed a companion bill in the Senate.6  With the midterm elections approaching, the Administra-
tion negotiated a compromise bill with McCain and Lieberman, which was passed by the Senate, was 
accepted by the House, and became law shortly after the November 2002 elections.7  
The Commission created by the 2002 legislation was an unusual, hybrid institution that refl ected 
the political compromises made during the legislative process.  The President appointed its Chair-
man, while the Democratic leaders of  the House and Senate appointed its Vice Chairman.8  The 
Senate and House leadership selected the other eight Commissioners—four by the Republican 
leaders and four by the Democratic leaders.9  The legislation also directed the Commission to submit 
its reports to both the President and Congress.10  And the legislation specifi ed—fatefully, it turned 
out—that the Commission was “established in the legislative branch.”11   
The statute directed Executive Branch agencies to cooperate fully with the Commission and to 
furnish it with the information it requested.12  But an unusual provision demanded by the distrustful 
family organizations granted the 9/11 Commission the power to subpoena witnesses and documents 
and to bring civil actions in federal district court to enforce those subpoenas.13   While the Commis-
sion proceeded generally by document requests and voluntary interviews of  witnesses, it found it 
necessary to issue subpoenas to Government agencies on three occasions.  The in terrorem effect of  
those subpoenas and the specter of  additional subpoenas turned out to be an important lever for 
getting documents and testimony.14
Early in the Commission’s existence, the Commissioners and staff  concluded that the Commis-
sion would need access to a wide range of  sensitive (and classifi ed) national security policy memo-
randa and decisional documents from the Clinton and Bush White Houses. Most of  these classifi ed 
documents were subject to possible claims of  executive privilege and were rarely, if  ever, made avail-
able to Congressional committees.  So the Commission’s strategy for obtaining access to these docu-
ments, and to testimony by policymaking offi cials about them, was therefore shaped in the context 
of  executive privilege doctrine.
6  See Kathy Kiely, 9/11 Widows Win Support for Commission, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2002, at 6A (stating that the main 
purpose behind creating the 9/11 commission was to assure a broader investigation rather than to stymie current efforts 
underway in Congress).
7  See David Firestone, White House Yields on a 9/11 Inquiry Backed by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.15, 2002, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/15/politics/15COMM.html?pagewanted=1(noting the families’ public complaints 
pressured President Bush to drop his initial opposition to a September 11 commission).
8  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306 § 603, 116 Stat. 2408 (2002).
9  Id.
10  Id. § 604.
11  Id. § 601.
12  Id. § 605.
13  Id. § 605.
14  See PHILIP SHENON, THE COMMISSION: THE UNCENSORED HISTORY OF THE 9/11 INVESTIGATION 203, 208, 307 (2008) 
(discussing the Commission’s subpoenas of  the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), and the City of  New York).
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LAW AND LORE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Although there is relatively little “law” on executive privilege, the doctrine has been around 
for a long time.  It has common-law origins, but it also has a constitutional basis in the doctrine of  
separation of  powers.15  Proponents of  the doctrine believe that if  the President is to carry out his 
Article II responsibilities,16 he needs to be able to receive confi dential advice from offi cials such as 
his National Security Advisor.17  The theory underlying executive privilege is the same as for other 
common-law privileges: Unless such communications are protected from disclosure, the candor 
necessary for the President (or the lawyer, the doctor, or the priest) to do his job will be fatally 
impaired.18  In Marbury v. Madison, Chief  Justice Marshall recognized, in passing, the need for such a 
privilege:  For a court to intrude into “the secrets of  the cabinet,” he wrote, would give the appear-
ance of  “intermeddl[ing] with the prerogatives of  the executive.”19 
The only Supreme Court decision to discuss the doctrine of  executive privilege in any detail – 
and the one that certifi es its constitutional pedigree—is the Watergate tapes case, United States v. Nix-
on.20  The Court recognized that separation of  powers, and the need of  the President for candid and 
objective advice from those on whom he relies to carry out his Article II powers, imply an executive 
privilege doctrine.21  But separation of  powers, said Chief  Justice Burger for a unanimous Court, 
also means that the executive privilege is not absolute:  The courts under Article III have a consti-
tutional duty to decide cases (and, presumably, Congress under Article I has a similar responsibility 
to legislate and conduct oversight of  the Executive Branch).22  This means that the President does 
not have an “absolute, unqualifi ed Presidential privilege of  immunity from judicial process under all 
circumstances.”23  Rather, the claim of  executive privilege must be balanced against the need of  the 
courts (or Congress) for the information.24  In the case of  the Watergate tapes, the Court held that 
the need of  the criminal justice system for information relevant to the trials of  the Watergate defen-
dants25 outweighed the President’s claim of  privilege.26
15  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
16  U.S. CONST. art. II.
17  See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
18  Id.
19  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (1803).
20  418 U.S. 683 (rejecting Nixon’s claim, with respect to audio tapes of  meetings between Nixon and his aides 
regarding the Watergate burglary, to “an absolute, unqualifi ed Presidential privilege of  immunity from judicial process 
under all circumstances”).
21  Id. at 708.
22  Id. at 704.
23  Id. at 706 (fi nding that absent a claim of  need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, 
the important interest in confi dentiality of  Presidential communications is signifi cantly diminished).
24  Id. at 711–12 (stating that the importance of  the general privilege of  confi dentiality of  Presidential 
communications in performance of  the President’s responsibilities must be weighed against the inroads of  such a 
privilege on the fair administration of  criminal justice).
25  Id. at 714.
26  Id. at 706 (characterizing the claim of  executive privilege as based on an “undifferentiated claim of  public interest 
in the confi dentiality of  [the taped Oval Offi ce] conversations”).
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Of  course, the Nixon tapes contained discussions of  politics, enemies’ lists, and criminal activi-
ties, rather than high policy matters relating to national security.  And the Court, in dictum, suggest-
ed that executive privilege would weigh much more heavily in the balance were the latter the case.27  
The Nixon dictum about national security was taken very seriously in the leading lower court de-
cision on executive privilege, In re Sealed Case.28  This case involved grand jury subpoenas for White 
House documents by the Independent Counsel (IC) investigating Secretary of  Agriculture Mike 
Espy for unlawfully accepting gifts from entities regulated by the Department.29  The White House 
Counsel’s Offi ce had conducted its own investigation of  the Espy matter to advise the President 
on what to do about him, and the IC requested the report and supporting documents from that 
investigation.30  After negotiations failed to satisfy the IC, he had the grand jury issue the subpoena, 
and the President claimed executive privilege as a basis for refusing to comply.31  Judge Wald, for a 
unanimous three-judge panel, took the occasion of  having to resolve the subpoena issues to write a 
comprehensive essay on the nature and scope of  executive privilege.32  
Judge Wald found that there are two overlapping privileges—a Presidential communications 
privilege recognized by the Supreme Court in Nixon, fl owing from the separation of  powers, and 
a traditional common-law “deliberative process” privilege for all Executive Branch decision-mak-
ing.33  She set forth a hierarchical scheme for deciding executive privilege questions, with Presi-
dential communications receiving greater protection than non-Presidential deliberative process 
communications,34 and with national security/foreign policy communications receiving greater 
protection than communications about the kinds of  tawdry matters involved in Nixon or the Espy 
investigation.  The Nixon decision, Judge Wald stated, “implied . . . that particularized claims of  
privilege for military and state secrets would be close to absolute.”35  Finally, and signifi cantly for 
the later 9/11 Commission context, Judge Wald broadly defi ned “Presidential communications” to 
include not only communications to or from the President, but also communications to the Presi-
dent’s advisors in the White House for the purpose of  providing advice to the President.36  Thus, 
interviews by the White House Counsel to obtain information for his report to the President on the 
27  Id. at 707 (calling for great deference to the President’s need for confi dentiality in his conversations with his 
advisors when tied to a claim of  need to protect sensitive national security, diplomatic, or military secrets).
28  121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
29  Id at 734–35.
30  Id. at 734–36 (arguing that the report, which concluded that no further executive action needed to be taken 
against Espy since he had announced his resignation, contained information which could shed light on governmental 
misconduct).
31 Id. at 735.
32  Id. at 742–758.
33  Id. at 745 (fi nding that the fi rst applied to the decision-making of  the President specifi cally, while the other applied 
to decision-making of  executive offi cials generally).
34  Id. at 745–46 (stating that the public-private interest balancing is more ad hoc in the context of  the deliberative 
process privilege, while a party seeking to overcome the presidential privilege must always provide a focused 
demonstration of  need).
35  Id. at 743 n. 12.
36  Id. at 751–52. 
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Espy matter were Presidential communications.37  In the case of  such Presidential communications, 
the court held, a federal prosecutor in a criminal case must show that the evidence sought is directly 
relevant to the case and is “practically unavailable elsewhere.”  Finally, Judge Wald cautioned that the 
balancing test might be different in the case of  Congressional demands for Presidential communica-
tions.38
Unsurprisingly, the Offi ce of  Legal Counsel (OLC) of  the Department of  Justice, in a series of  
opinions in recent decades, has taken a broad view of  the President’s authority to assert executive 
privilege to withhold from Congress documents the disclosure of  which, in the President’s judg-
ment, would be harmful to national security or foreign relations.39  OLC has endorsed a process 
whereby the Executive Branch seeks to negotiate compromise arrangements to “accommodate” 
Congressional requests or demands for documents, so as to avoid the need for the President to 
claim executive privilege.40  But it has held steadfast to the proposition that the President, in the 
last analysis, has the power to do so.  Similarly, OLC has opined that under the separation of  pow-
ers, Congress may not compel White House offi cials who advise the President to appear to testify 
at Congressional hearings–at least on policy matters.41  These opinions rely not only on executive 
privilege notions, but also on the need to prevent Congress from impairing the functioning of  the 
Presidency by diverting the President’s advisors from their White House duties.42
THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND THE WHITE HOUSE 
The White House had two major concerns about sensitive policy documents requested by the 
Commission.  The fi rst was that their disclosure to the Commission could lead to a public disclosure 
harmful to national security.43  In theory, that was not a problem: The sensitive documents were all 
37  Id. at 758.
38  Id. at 753.
39  See Assertion for Executive Privilege for Documents Concerning Conduct of  Foreign Relations With Respect to Haiti, 1996 WL 
34386606, at 1-2 (O.L.C. 1996) [hereinafter Haiti] (referring to then-Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist’s 
conclusion that the President can withhold information if  in his judgment disclosure would be incompatible with the 
public interest).  See generally, Prosecution for Contempt of  Congress of  an Executive Branch Offi cial Who Has Asserted a Claim of  
Executive Privilege, 1984 WL 178358 (1984) (reciting a history of  executive privilege claims).
40  See Assertion of  Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel’s Offi ce Documents, 1996 WL 34386607, at 1 
(O.L.C. 1996) [hereinafter Assertion of  Executive Privilege] (displaying OLC’s concern that any compliance beyond 
the accommodations reached would compromise the ability of  the White House Counsel to assist the President in 
connection with the pending Committee and Independent Counsel investigations).  See also, Haiti, supra note 39, at 1.
41  See Immunity of  Former Counsel to the President From Compelled Congressional Testimony, 2007 WL 5038035, at 1 (O.L.C. 
2007) (citing Assertion of  Executive Privilege With Respect to Clemency Decision, 1999 WL 33490208, at 4 (O.L.C. 1999)) (stating 
that this immunity is “absolute and may not be overborne by competing congressional interests”).
42  See 1996 WL 34386607, at 1 (arguing that White House Counsel’s capacity to serve the President effectively would 
be signifi cantly impaired if  the confi dentiality of  its communications and work-product is not protected).
43  See Letter from Thomas A. Monheim, Associate Counsel to the President, to Daniel Marcus, General Counsel of  
the 9/11 Commission (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.scribd.com/White-House-Letter-to-911-Commission-
about-Access-to-Notes/d/12992807 [hereinafter Monheim Letter 1] (creating rules regarding the documents to protect 
the constitutional prerogatives of  the Presidency).
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classifi ed and could not lawfully be publicly disclosed by the Commissioners or staff—in the Com-
mission Report or otherwise—without fi rst being declassifi ed by the Administration.  But the White 
House worried that disclosure of  sensitive documents or information to ten Commissioners and 
additional staff  members could lead to unauthorized leaks.44
The second and more serious concern was with precedent: The Commission was by statute a 
“legislative branch entity,”45 and the White House Counsel’s Offi ce and OLC worried that any disclo-
sures to the Commission would be viewed as a precedent for the White House’s dealings with Con-
gress.  The Commission argued that the separation of  powers principles that underlie the executive 
privilege doctrine did not apply to the Commission with the same force they applied to Congress, 
i.e., to the legislative branch itself.  The Commission, obviously, was not the Legislature, and had no 
continuing power to control or regulate the actions of  the Executive Branch.  The Commission’s job 
was to prepare a report for the President as well as Congress.46  Disclosure to the Commission—a 
one-time, one-investigation entity—therefore would not undermine the Executive Branch’s long-
standing positions vis-à-vis Congress.
The White House strongly resisted this argument until early 2004, when it fi nally decided to 
permit some Commissioners and staff  to examine Presidential Daily Briefs (top-secret intelligence 
reports to the President) relevant to the Commission’s investigation, and to allow National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice to testify under oath at a public hearing of  the Commission.47  At that 
point, the White House Counsel pivoted 180 degrees and proclaimed publicly that the Commission 
was a unique entity and that disclosures to it did not constitute a precedent for the White House’s 
dealings with Congress.
DOCUMENT REQUESTS:  MATTERS OF PRECEDENT AND STRATEGY
In its initial document requests to the White House, the Commission made a strategic decision, 
in light of  the court precedents discussed above and the strong views of  the White House on execu-
tive privilege, to stop short of  the Oval Offi ce itself.  Thus, the Commission requested all relevant 
National Security Council (NSC) policy documents on counterterrorism matters from within the 
NSC Directorate of  Transnational Threats (headed by the Counterterrorism Coordinator, Richard 
Clarke) and from Principals and Deputies Meetings of  the NSC, as well as communications from 
Clarke to the National Security Advisor (Samuel Berger in the Clinton Administration and Condo-
44  See Letter from Thomas A. Monheim, Associate Counsel to the President, to Daniel Marcus, General Counsel of  
the 9/11 Commission (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/15707930/DM-B7-White-House-2-of-
2-Fdr-Document-Request-Responses-429 [hereinafter Monheim Letter 2] (stating that concerns existed regarding the 
Commission’s ability to protect the documents from unauthorized disclosure and from use for any purpose other than 
the purpose for which the Commission made the request). 
45  See Intelligence Authorization Act § 601.
46  Intelligence Authorization Act at § 603.
47  See Letter from John B. Bellinger III, Senior Associate Counsel to the President, to Daniel Marcus, General 
Counsel of  the 9/11 Commission, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/15707930/DM-B7-White-House-2-of-2-Fdr-
Document-Request-Responses-429.
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leezza Rice in the Bush Administration).48  But the Commission did not request communications 
from Berger to Clinton or Rice to Bush, and it agreed not to question witnesses about what was said 
in conversations with the President.49  
The White House Counsel’s Offi ce remained apprehensive about the scope and sensitivity of  
the Commission’s request, and it took extensive negotiations of  a detailed written “treaty” before 
the Commission could get access to the requested documents.  The breakthrough that assured that 
access occurred when the Commission staff  assured the White House lawyers that the Commis-
sion would not claim that the nonpublic release of  documents to the Commission would constitute 
a waiver of  executive privilege (a debatable proposition), and that the President could still claim the 
privilege to block the publication of  material from these documents in the fi nal Commission re-
port.50 
In keeping with the longstanding practice of  the White House and the Department of  Justice 
in dealing with document requests or subpoenas from Congressional Committees or Independent 
Counsels, this negotiation explored ways the Administration could accommodate the Commission’s 
document requests to avoid a legal confrontation and the need for the President formally to claim 
executive privilege.  As a result of  this negotiation, the Commission gained access to the requested 
documents, but subject to certain restrictions on time, manner, and place.  These included (1) the 
Commission could not make copies of  any documents; (2) the documents could not “leave” the 
Executive Branch, but had to be reviewed by the Commissioners and a limited number of  Commis-
sion staff  at the White House; (3) while the Commissioners and staff  could take notes on all but 
the most “super-sensitive” documents, notes on some other highly sensitive documents could not 
be taken back to the Commission’s secure offi ces, but had to be left at the White House (where they 
could be “visited” as needed); and (4) the notes on other documents, which could be taken back to 
the Commission’s offi ce, could not be verbatim or “effectively recreate” the document (so as to pro-
tect condition No. 1). Condition No. 4 led to endless disputes in the implementation.
Similar negotiations and written agreements were necessary to settle the terms for interviews 
of  White House offi cials (or “meetings,” as the White House insisted on calling them to avoid any 
implication that the White House was submitting to the jurisdiction of  the Commission).51  Those 
48  See Letter from Philip D. Zelikow, Executive Director of  the 9/11 Commission, and Daniel Marcus, General 
Counsel of  the 9/11 Commission, to Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel (Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/12992726/Repeat-911-Commission-Request-for-Missing-White-House-Documents (requesting records 
from the meetings of  the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, the “Foreign Policy Team,” the “UBL Small 
Group,” the “UBL/Khobar Small Group,” the “Planning Group,” or the “Restricted CSG”).
49  See 9/11 COMMISSION, 9/11 RELEASES INTERIM REPORT: TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS BRIEFING WITH THOMAS H. 
KEAN, CHAIR, AND LEE H. HAMILTON, VICE CHAIR 9 (July 8, 2003), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
archive/2003-07-08_press_briefi ng.pdf. 
50  Of  course, the documents in question were almost all classifi ed, so that the Commission could not in any event 
publicly disclose their contents without permission from the White House.
51  See Letter from Thomas A. Monheim, Associate Counsel to the President, to Daniel Marcus, General Counsel to 
the 9/11 Commission, (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/13279730/White-House-Letter-to-911-
Commission-about-Limits-on-Access-to-White-House-Offi cials (prescribing certain conditions for access to Executive 
Offi ce of  the President offi cials).
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negotiations resulted in the Commission being able to “meet with” every senior White House of-
fi cial it requested, but, again, subject to a number of  restrictions:  Only the Chair or Vice Chair of  
the Commission or the Commission’s Executive Director or General Counsel could conduct the 
questioning of  senior White House offi cials (or Cabinet offi cers); the number of  staff  members 
who could attend and the time of  the meetings were limited (although in practice extended as long 
as necessary); and the interview-meetings with White House offi cials–unlike those of  other Execu-
tive Branch offi cials, including Cabinet offi cers–could not be recorded.52 
The Commission expected, and encountered, particular resistance to the President or Vice 
President (who never testify before Congressional Committees or submit to informal questioning) 
“appearing” before the Commission in any meaningful sense.  Until the Spring of  2004, the position 
of  both the White House and the Offi ce of  the Vice President (which, the Vice President’s Counsel, 
David Addington, insisted, was not part of  the Executive Offi ce of  the President and was not rep-
resented by the Counsel to the President) was that the President and Vice President would be willing 
to meet informally only with the Chair and Vice Chair of  the Commission—Tom Kean and Lee 
Hamilton.  However, after the public hearing in March 2004 at which Richard Clarke condemned the 
counterterrorism record of  President Bush and his national security advisors before 9/11, the White 
House abruptly changed its position and informed the Commission that the President and Vice 
President would hold a joint “meeting” with all ten Commissioners (with one Commission staff  
member allowed to attend to take notes).53  
There were two issues as to which the Commission, unhappy with the position the White House 
was taking in response to its requests, discussed whether to issue a subpoena to the White House; in 
the case of  the fi rst of  those issues the Commission came very close to voting to issue a subpoena.  
As General Counsel, I was dubious about the wisdom of  issuing a subpoena for White House 
records or testimony, for two reasons:  (1) I was convinced that the White House would defy any 
subpoena, requiring the Commission to bring an enforcement action in District Court in which it 
was almost certain it could not get a favorable fi nal judgment before the Commission’s statutory life 
expired; and (2) I believed that the issuance of  a subpoena would lead the White House to severely 
limit its cooperation with the Commission across the board, impairing the effectiveness of  the Com-
52  Id.
53  See Philip Shenon and David E. Sanger, Bush and Cheney Tell 9/11 Panel of  ’01 Warnings, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
30, 2004 (describing the three hour question-and-answer session with the 10 members of  the Commission); see also 
NBC News’ Meet the Press (television broadcast Apr. 4, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/4663767/#storyContinued ) (explaining the conditions for the interview with President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney).
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mission’s remaining investigation and the thoroughness of  the Report.54
 PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFS
The fi rst issue on which the Commission and the White House almost fell off  the tightrope 
concerned the now-famous Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs)—the highly sensitive daily reports to 
the President, prepared by the CIA, on the latest intelligence information related to national securi-
ty.55  Before 9/11 the existence of  the PDBs was not widely known.  But shortly after 9/11, rumors 
began circulating that on August 6, 2001 – a month before the 9/11 attacks—President Bush had 
received a PDB that contained an explicit warning that al Qaeda was planning an imminent attack 
on the United States using commercial airplanes as weapons.56  In an effort to defl ate those rumors, 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had held a rare press conference on May 16, 2002, 
where she summarized the August 6 PDB as having presented a purely historical review of  al Qaeda 
threats against the United States.57  But the Administration refused to make the August 6 PDB pub-
lic or to turn it over to the Congressional Joint Inquiry that was then pending.58
The Commissioners believed that, in order to evaluate the adequacy of  the Clinton and Bush 
Administration’s counterterrorism policies and actions, they needed to review not only the August 
6 PDB, but all relevant PDBs from both the Clinton and Bush Administrations to see what infor-
54  The Commission did issue subpoenas to two Executive Branch agencies–the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Department of  Defense–and to the City of  New York after problems arose in 
document production.  The federal agencies complied fully with the subpoenas.  New York City, after initially resisting, 
agreed to a settlement of  the Commission’s demands on the eve of  the return date of  the subpoena.  At that point, 
the Department of  Justice had prepared papers on behalf  of  the Commission to fi le in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of  New York to enforce the subpoena.
Of  course, had the Commission needed to enforce a subpoena against the White House or any other federal agency, the 
Department of  Justice could not represent the Commission.  While the Commission had pro bono counsel prepared to 
represent it, it is theoretically possible that the Attorney General could have been able to block the Commission’s lawsuit. 
OLC has long taken the position that, unless Congress by statute provides a government agency–even one outside 
the Executive Branch–with its own litigating authority, the Attorney General has exclusive authority to decide whether 
that agency can bring a lawsuit.   Politically, however, it would have been diffi cult, if  not impossible for the Justice 
Department to deny the Commission authority to bring the subpoena enforcement action with private counsel.
55  See Thomas Blanton, Who’s Afraid of  the PDB?, SLATE, Mar. 22, 2004 (citing various sources that described this 
document as the “most highly sensitized classifi ed document in the government” and to make this available to an outside 
group is “something that no other president has done in our history”).
56  See 9/11 Commission Report, p.260 (describing the circumstances surrounding the origins of  the August 6 PDB); 
see also Bob Woodward and Dan Eggen, Aug. Memo Focused On Attacks in U.S., WASHINGTON POST, May 19, 2002, at A01 
(stating the headline of  the PDB was ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.’),.
57  See David Johnston and James Risen, Traces of  Terrorism: The Intelligence Reports; Series of  Warnings, NY TIMES, May 
17, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/17/us/traces-of-terrorism-the-intelligence-reports-series-of-
warnings.html?scp=2&sq=condoleezza+rice&st=nyt.
58  See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESS BRIEFING BY ARI FLEISCHER, May 21, 2002, available 
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020521-9.html (setting forth the President’s 
views as to why the August 6 PDB had not been released to Congress or made public).
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mation about the al Qaeda threat was available to both Presidents.59  The Commission therefore 
requested all PDB items (or “articles”) relating to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia from 1998 (the year in which bin Laden issued his fatwa calling for 
jihad against Americans and al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam) 
through September 20, 2001.60
The White House reported that, while there were more than 300 PDB articles responsive to the 
Commission’s request, only approximately 20 met the criteria that were important, in their view, to 
the Commission’s investigation.61  The initial White House position was that none of  the Commis-
sioners or staff  could see any of  the PDBs—not even the notorious August 6 PDB—because of  
their sensitive nature.  No PDB, they claimed, had ever been shown even to the Chairman of  the 
Senate or House Intelligence Committees (an assertion that, as far as the Commission could deter-
mine, was correct). In lieu of  producing the documents, they proposed a briefi ng of  Commission-
ers and senior staff  by CIA offi cials familiar with the PDBs.  The Commission agreed to accept the 
briefi ng, but without prejudice to its right to pursue the document request if  the briefi ng did not 
satisfy the Commission’s needs.
When the Commissioners, unanimously, found the briefi ng unsatisfactory, the Commission staff  
embarked on a lengthy and ultimately successful negotiation with the White House lawyers, result-
ing in a compromise deal (grudgingly approved by the Commission) under which the core group of  
PDBs would be reviewed by a Commission “Review Team” consisting of  the Chair, Vice Chair, and 
one additional Republican and Democratic Commissioner or senior staff  offi cial.  Two members 
of  this team were allowed to “check” the rest of  the 300-plus responsive PDBs to see whether they 
thought any of  them should be added to the core group of  PDBs as to which the Review Team 
would prepare a “concise summary” report that would be made available to the rest of  the ten Com-
missioners and the senior staff.62  Both the switch of  any PDBs from the larger pool to the core 
group and the summary report to the full Commission on the core group required approval from 
the White House Counsel–an approval, per the agreement, not to be unreasonably withheld.  The 
White House lawyers, advised by OLC, viewed these negotiations as in the tradition of  the process 
of  “accommodation” used by the Executive Branch in seeking to avoid the ultimate need for the 
President to invoke executive privilege as the basis for refusing to turn over documents to a Con-
gressional committee.63  
59  See SHENON, supra note 14, at 73–76 (stating that Executive Director Zelikow believed that the Commission must 
see the PDBs if  it was to do its job properly).
60  See id. at 388–89 (indicating that Zelikow wanted the information for the fi nal report of  the Commission, which 
was to include a history of  al Qaeda and bin Laden’s fatwa, the threat reporting records leading up to 9/11, and the 
attacks themselves).
61  Id. at 218.
62  Dan Eggen, 9/11 Panel to Accept Summary of  Briefi ngs; Legal Challenge Scrapped; Agreement Angers Some Members, Victims’ 
Families, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 11, 2004 at A08.
63  See Andy Card on Power and Privilege, NAT’L JOURNAL, Apr. 28, 2004, available at
http://nationaljournal.com/members/news/2004/04/0428insider.htm (noting that the White House was cognizant of  
not eroding too much authority from the Executive Branch by overusing executive privilege).
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Twice–fi rst, when it looked as if  the agreement just described would not be reached, and second, 
when major disputes arose in the implementation of  the agreement (as to how many PDBs would 
be “moved” from the 300+ group to the core group, and as to the length and detail of  the “concise 
summary report”)–the Commission seriously considered subpoenaing either the PDBs themselves 
or the extensive notes that Commissioner Jamie Gorelick and Executive Director Philip Zelikow had 
taken on the 300+ group of  PDBs.64  Because these disputes were resolved, the Commission did not 
need to issue such subpoenas and avoided falling into the chasm of  total war with the White House.
Both the Commission’s outside counsel, Robert Weiner of  Arnold & Porter, and I believed, 
however, that if  the subpoena had been issued, and the matter had proceeded to court, the Commis-
sion would have had a good chance of  eventually prevailing (although probably not in time to meet 
the statutory deadline for issuance of  the Commission’s report).  To be sure, the Administration 
could argue that the PDBs, by their nature as communications to the President of  highly sensitive 
intelligence about terrorist threats against the United States, fell toward the highly-protected end 
of  the spectrum in terms of  the identity of  the recipient (the President himself) and subject mat-
ter.  On the other hand, the Commission could emphasize that (1) the sensitivity of  the documents 
to national security was diminished by the fact that they contained information about past threats, 
not current ones; (2) they were in the main factual reports rather than deliberative policy documents; 
(3) they were prepared and delivered, not by senior advisors to the President, but by mid-level CIA 
analysts; (4) they were delivered, not only to the President, but also to a number of  senior offi cials 
outside the White House (e.g., presumably, the Secretary of  State and the Secretary of  Defense); and 
(5) the Commission was not proposing to publicly release the documents (indeed, Commission 
members could be sent to jail for doing so), but simply to use them in preparing the Report, which 
itself  could not be publicly released until it was reviewed and cleared by the Administration.
RICE TESTIMONY
The second instance in which a number of  Commissioners advocated a subpoena was to com-
pel the public testimony of  Condoleezza Rice, then the National Security Advisor.65  For months, 
the White House Counsel had stuck to a simple position on behalf  of  the President:  In line with 
historical practice in dealing with Congress, the White House would make offi cials such as Rice, 
Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and Chief  of  Staff  Andrew Card available for 
private meetings with Commissioners and staff–not under oath–but not for public testimony, under 
oath or otherwise.  They relied on the OLC opinions, based on separation of  powers and the need 
of  the Chief  Executive to have the undivided attention of  his staff, that Congress could not compel 
64  See SHENON, supra note 14, at 222–224 (indicating that the threat of  subpoena became serious enough that the 
Commission authorized its General Counsel to hire an outside constitutional expert to prepare for a likely legal battle 
with the White House over a subpoena).
65  See Associated Press, 9/11 Panel Considers Rice Subpoena, MSNBC.com, Mar. 2, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/4401034/ (noting that the fi rst choice of  the Commission was to get the White House to reconsider its 
refusal to allow Rice to testify).
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their testimony.66
This OLC “law,” however, had never been tested in the courts.  And it was developed before 
the Supreme Court’s remarkable decision in Clinton v. Jones, holding that separation of  powers does 
not preclude an Article III court from compelling the testimony of  the President himself  in a civil 
lawsuit.67  To be sure, that case is distinguishable from that of  the 9/11 Commission investigation 
because it involved private rather than offi cial acts of  the President.68  And as to offi cial acts, the 
Court has held that the President is immune from civil damage suits.69  Nonetheless, it undermines a 
central rationale of  OLC’s separation-of  -powers reasoning with respect to compelled testimony of  
White House offi cials.  If  the Constitution permits a court to require the President himself  to divert 
his time as Chief  Executive to testify in a mundane civil damages case, would it really be unconsti-
tutional to require the President to allow his National Security Advisor to testify publicly before a 
one-time-only independent Commission investigating the most traumatic event in modern American 
history?70
The biggest problem facing the Commission in a judicial action to enforce a subpoena to com-
pel Rice’s testimony—and probably a fatal one—was that it would have been diffi cult to show that 
the Commission had a strong need for Rice’s public testimony in view of  the fact that it had already 
interviewed her privately for almost four hours.71  
The question of  subpoenaing Rice to testify became moot, in any event, when the Administra-
tion abruptly changed its position in March 2004, after the Clarke testimony, and requested the op-
portunity for her to testify–under oath.72
CONCLUSION
 The law of  executive privilege evolves slowly, because the White House and Justice Depart-
66  Assertion of  Executive Privilege, supra note 40.
67  See 520 U.S. 681, 705–706 (1997) (establishing that a sitting President of  the United States has no immunity from 
civil litigation for acts done before taking offi ce and unrelated to the offi ce).
68  See id. at 701 (asserting that “whatever the outcome of  this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail 
the scope of  the offi cial powers of  the Executive Branch”).
69  See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (emphasizing that the President is not immune 
from criminal charges stemming from his offi cial (or unoffi cial) acts while in offi ce).
70  In July 2008, the OLC position on the immunity of  senior White House offi cials was further undermined by a 
thoughtful opinion by Judge John Bates, upholding the authority of  the House Judiciary Committee, in its investigation 
of  the fi ring of  U.S. Attorneys, to require the former Counsel to the President, Harriet Miers, to appear before the 
Committee for questioning.  Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008), stay denied, 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2008), stay granted, 542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  Miers had been instructed by President Bush, 
on the grounds of  executive privilege and separation of  powers, to refuse to appear.  The court rejected the claim of  
absolute immunity for senior White House offi cials, holding that Miers must appear and claim executive privilege, where 
appropriate, in response to particular questions.  Judge Bates noted, however, that the case did not involve national 
security or foreign policy.  558 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
71  See  SHENON, supra note 14, at 290.
72  See Wolf  Blitzer, Condoleezza Rice Testifi es Before 9/11 Commission, CNN, Apr. 8, 2004 (describing Ms. Rice’s testimony 
during her hearing with the 9/11 Commission).
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ment make strenuous and usually successful efforts, through the process of  negotiation and ac-
commodation, to reach compromises with Congressional committees (or the 9/11 Commission) to 
avoid the need for the President ultimately to invoke the privilege as a basis for refusing to comply 
with a document request or subpoena.  Had the Commission found it necessary to issue a subpoena 
in either of  the two instances described above, the law might have been pushed along a bit.  For the 
reasons stated, I think it might well have been pushed along signifi cantly in the case of  the PDBs.  
The Commission’s arguments, in both cases, would have been aided by what I perceive as the general 
trends in the law with respect to both common-law privileges and separation of  powers.  
I have not studied the area, but I have the impression that the courts are increasingly skepti-
cal of, and unreceptive to, claims of  attorney-client privilege and other common-law privileges.  As 
time goes by, and apocalyptic predictions of  the chilling effect on confi dential communications if  
privilege claims are rejected prove unfounded, a cycle develops in which courts become less likely 
to recognize the next claim of  privilege.  A good example is provided by decisions by the Courts of  
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit in the late 1990s, rejecting claims that the attor-
ney-client privilege protected communications between Government lawyers and their Government 
“clients”, including communications between the Deputy Counsel to the President, Bruce Lindsey, 
and President Clinton.73  Those decisions occasioned dire predictions as to the devastating impact on 
the ability of  Government lawyers to give confi dential advice to the President and agency heads.74  
And so the initial controversial decisions rejecting the claim of  privilege become uncontroversial, 
and the courts are vindicated in their skepticism about the policy claims underlying the assertion of  
privilege.
I also believe that, in a real sense, the Commission’s success in obtaining signifi cant if  limited 
access to the PDBs and Condoleezza Rice’s public testimony under oath made some important “law 
on the ground.”  The exaggerated mystique of  the PDBs was punctured, at least with respect to 
historical documents.  We learned from the 9/11 Commission Report that we could have a public 
discussion of  intelligence information provided to the President in the past without jeopardizing the 
ability of  our intelligence agencies to operate effectively.  That lesson was underlined by the sub-
sequent investigation by the WMD Commission (the Silberman-Robb Commission), an Executive 
Branch entity which had extensive access to PDBs and issued a public report discussing pre-Iraq 
War intelligence failures.75
Similarly, Condoleezza Rice’s public testimony before the 9/11 Commission established an 
73  See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that an attorney-client privilege could not be 
applied to White House Counsel as applied to private counsel); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 
921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1998) (indicating that a public offi cial should speak with a private attorney, 
not a government attorney if  he wants the confi dentiality of  the communication protected).
74  See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Second Circuit says Government Lawyers Have Privilege Too, TRIAL, May 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Second Circuit says government lawyers have privilege too-a0132536079 (suggesting 
that offi cials and agencies may have a genuine interest in seeking advice about whether an action is lawful or not, and 
that the denial of  a privilege may discourage the seeking of  such advice).
75  THE COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, Mar. 31, 2005, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf.
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important precedent in fact that may well eventually be refl ected in OLC opinions and court deci-
sions.  It illustrates the changing role of  senior White House offi cials such as the National Security 
Advisor.76  As policymaking for the Executive Branch continues to move from a Cabinet Depart-
ment-centered system to a White House-centered and White House-directed system, it becomes less 
plausible to regard offi cials such as the National Security Advisor exclusively as confi dential advisors 
to the President rather than policy-making offi cials in their own right.  Once that perception chang-
es, the argument that such offi cials should be immune from compelled testimony before Congress 
or independent Commissions becomes less viable.  
76  See Dr. I. M. Destler, The Role of  the National Security Advisor, FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, Mar. 16, 2009, available 
at  http://fpc.state.gov/120437.htm (describing how the position of  National Security Advisor was created, the key 
elements of  the job, and its changing role in the Obama Administration).
